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TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS INTERNAL 
TO INTERNATIONAL OIL COMPANIES 
AS AN IMPORTANT COMPONENT 
OF EUROPEAN ENERGY SECURITY
The abundance of natural resources, in other words, 
was itself an outgrowth of America’s technological progress1.
Introduction 
It has been well established that intra-corporation economic ties play an important 
and growing role in the global economy. Simultaneously an importance of energy 
security has been examined thoroughly. However very few academics have un-
dertaken researches related to interconnections of American and European opera-
tions of International Oil Companies and these relations’ signiﬁ cant contribution to 
strengthen energy security. This article pretends to ﬁ ll up this gap, while analysing 
dynamics of this relations in view of challenges faced by the oil sector at the be-
ginning of XXI century. The chief importance amongst them are associated with:
• an accelerating expansion of so called National Oil Companies, which 
show growing ambitions in areas traditionally for the established counter 
partners (IOCs) like reﬁ ning and drilling technology to name a few;
1 E.B. Barbier, Scarcity and Frontiers. How Economies Have Developed Through Natural 
Resource Exploitation, Cambridge 2011.
XI
: 2
01
4 n
r 2
112 ROBERT UBERMAN
• ambitions of Russian companies (Gazprom, Rosneft, Lukoil) to become 
a new leading forces on the global stage;
• narrowing access to attractive hydrocarbon resources;
• shale gas and shale oil revolution in the US.
A key hypotheses analysed set forth in the article demonstrates that:
• Europe gradually loses importance for leading International Oil Compa-
nies (IOCs);
• the above indicated phenomenon may pose a real threat to the European 
energy security.
• commencing negotiations between USA and EU on Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP) represent an excellent opportunity to take 
measures aimed at oﬀ setting the above indicated developments.
Transatlantic operations of International Oil Companies 
– historical perspective and trends
The history of transatlantic oil relations is as old as oil industry itself. The ﬁ rst 
oil shipment from USA to London occurred in 1861. The very ﬁ rst important in-
vestment of an US based IOC in Europe came in 1921 when ExxonMobil (then 
the Standard Oil of New Jersey Company) constructed it’s ﬁ rst UK reﬁ nery in 
Fawley. It was actually the fourth big scale unit in Great Britain. In fact Exxon had 
been present there form 1888, the year of establishing the ﬁ rst oﬃ  ce in London. 
As of 1938 this was the only non-British owned reﬁ nery out of 8 but represented 
near 40% of the total capacity. After the II World War others followed the suit, so 
in 1970 US bases OIC operated 6 big reﬁ neries with near half of the total British 
capacity2. Simultaneously other European countries had been targeted with various 
downstream investments spanning from production units to pump stations. Another 
area of American investments was created by the BP discovery of North Sea oil-
ﬁ elds in 1970, basically bringing upstream operations back to Europe (Romanian 
and Ukrainian reservoirs, then the only signiﬁ cant producing oil assets in Europe 
remained closed for IOCs due to the communist legal regime).
The reverse trend also occurred with Europe based IOC investing in the 
USA. In 1912, the Royal Dutch/Shell Group opened its ﬁ rst American branches, 
in 1915 completed ﬁ rst continuous-process reﬁ nery and in 1921 discovered its ﬁ rst 
oilﬁ eld: Signal Hill entering the upstream business on the other side of Atlantic. 
The second British oil company – BP, came later but in late 60s made the biggest 
oil discovery in North America: Prudhoe Bay reservoir in Alaska. The French IOC 
– Total can be proud of being one of the ﬁ rst companies in US petrochemical indus-
try through operations of American Petroﬁ na started at 1956.
2 DOE UK, Government, Oil Refi neries and Bulk Storage of Crude Oil Systems, Ruislip 1995.
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The above presented activities created a room for both tensions and coop-
eration between American and European Oil companies. The very ﬁ rst conﬂ ict 
ﬁ nished with famous Achnacarry Agreement made in 1928 between Standard Oil 
of John Rockefeller and Royal Dutch Shell of Henry Deterding – in fact dividing 
global oil market among its signatories and starting a tradition of oil cartels3.
This dual system had continued, although new players were joining, to form 
a famous “Seven sisters” group, ﬁ ve of them originated from the US and two from 
United Kingdom (although one: Shell has been traditionally associated also with 
the Netherlands). Responding to ambitions demonstrated by other developed coun-
tries some researchers and practitioners added Total and Elf of France as well as 
ENI of Italy to this list. Surprisingly very few noticed achievements of the Japa-
nese Nippon Oil which legitimately could have been aﬃ  xed to this list, keeping it 
purely “transatlantic”, e.g. American and European. The “sisters” had interlocked 
in an extensive network of connections spanned from well-known foreign oil ﬁ elds 
development projects (especially in the Persian Gulf) to various R&D activities. 
The “golden period” of their dominance falls between the end of II World War and 
outbreak of the ﬁ rst oil crisis in 1973. Scientiﬁ c and popular literature is (over) 
loaded with papers analysing reasons of their dominance and decline4. 
In consequence up to 90s of XX century the petroleum industry had been 
concentrated on both side of North Atlantic with dominance in reﬁ ning and oth-
er downstream activities as well as with almost full exclusivity as far as research 
and development is concerned. Beyond Europe and North America one could ﬁ nd 
exploration and extraction activities as well as markets for generic oil products. 
Creation of an European economic zone, ﬁ rstly under EEC and then under EU and 
relaxation of trade and investment barriers under GATT or mutual agreements on 
one side allowed for growing concentration of oil & gas companies in developed 
countries while relative backwardness kept companies from OPEC at bay. The peak 
of this dual dominance was reached, when a string of so called mergers of elephants 
created a group of 6 supermajors: 3 coming originally from US (ExxonMobil, 
Chevron, ConocoPhilips and 3 from Europe (BP, Royal Dutch Shell, Total) but all 
landing with assets on both sides of Atlantic. Simultaneously, however, two other 
trends became clear and started to change a global picture of oil and gas industry5:
• National Oil Companies (NIOC) had gradually evolved from their pre-
vious role of guardians of oil reservoirs and revenues streams for their re-
spective governments and expanded their activities towards downstream and 
R&D, some with notable successes, at least in certain areas. Unfortunately, 
3 A. Sampson, Siedem sióstr, transl. J. Bielski, Warszawa 1981 [eng. ed.: The Seven Sisters: 
The Great Oil Companies and the World They Shaped, New York 1975].
4 D. Yergin, The Prize. The Epic Quest For Oil, Money and Power, New York 2009, p. 595– 
–599.
5 S. Coll, Private Empire: ExxonMobil and American Power, London, 2012, p. 60–66; 
D. Yergin, The Quest. Energy, Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World, London 2011, p. 83–
–104.
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with exception of Norwegian Statoil, the were neither European of origin nor 
their key units were operating in Europe.
• America shale gas revolution not only opened new resources of hydro-
carbons for commercially viable extraction but strengthened once again US 
technological leadership both in the area of upstream and downstream. All 
three leading exploration equipment and technology companies: Schlumber-
ger, Halliburton and Baker Hughes were and still are located in the USA. 
Moreover, falling energy prices in North America combined with some other 
factors shifted a competitiveness balance in downstream manufacturing back 
towards American plants6. 
Both above mentioned developments appeared simultaneously with expan-
sion of so called “emerging countries”, mostly located in Asia. Consequently all of 
them have led to weakening of Europe’s attractiveness for global oil & gas com-
panies, as a place to locate their core assets and activities. It is noteworthy that 
after the fall of communism, when majority of multinational corporations rushed 
to Eastern Europe motivated by both opening market and competitive labour, Oil 
& Gas companies kept distant.  With a notable exception of Shell and Conoco-
Philips engagement in the Ceska Raﬁ nerska and Shell’s and BP’s building petrol 
stations chains Oil Majors have not made any signiﬁ cant investment in this area. It 
was not caused by a diﬀ erent view on relative attractiveness of emerging Europe 
versus the old one. Here there has been no discrepancies. The real reason was the 
relative decline of Europe as a whole what discouraged ExxonMobil and alikes to 
invest even in the most attractive part of the continent. 
Sustaining dominance of the American oil market and it’s consequences 
for transatlantic operations
Surprisingly for many scholars, at present we are experiencing another era of 
American dominance in the oil & gas industry. The combination of horizontal dril-
ling and hydraulic fracturing has unlocked huge deposits of natural gas and oil 
known earlier but considered unfeasible to extract. The shale gas revolution has 
brought production of both shale gas and oil to unexpected high levels, and addi-
tional growth is expected to occur. The International Energy Agency now forecasts 
that the United States once again will become the world’s biggest oil producer (by 
2020) and a net oil exporter (by 2030)7. Although the ﬁ rst projects had been carried 
out by independent companies swiftly supermajors came on board with the most 
spectacular investment of ExxonMobil which acquired the leading shale gas produ-
cer XTO in 2009 for 41 billion USD. But all others have obtained signiﬁ cant level 
6 Ibidem, p. 329–332.
7 S. Lund et al., Game changers: Five Opportunities for US Growth and Renewal, McKinsey 
Global Institute 2013, p. 22.
115TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS...
of exposure to this sector. To give one example: Shell’s advocacy of natural gas in 
the energy mix led the Dutch corporation to invest over 25 billion USD in North 
American shale gas projects – 1/3 of the total capital expenditures for the period 
2011–2013.
A sudden abundance of natural gas and, to less extend, oil, combined with 
certain infrastructure constrains, has fundamentally lowered prices of primary 
energy sources in inland USA. All energy-intensive downstream industries beneﬁ -
ted signiﬁ cantly from this process with reﬁ neries and petrochemical plants among 
the biggest winners. And because technology needs some time to be eﬀ ectively 
transferred and applied, North America may be able to sustain its shale gas and oil 
advantage over other countries for the next ten to 15 years8. 
The shale gas revolution underlined once again importance of real long-term 
fundaments of American leadership in oil & gas industry, lying beyond access to 
physically present natural resources: 
• Technological expertise – it was the research and development as well as 
manufacturing capacities and existing energy infrastructure across America, 
which ﬁ rstly created conditions for technology creation and commercialisa-
tion and then allowed to rapidly scale up successful eﬀ orts. 
• Eﬃ  cient capital markets, which ﬁ nanced early stage highly risky activi-
ties big companies consider too hazardous to promote.
• Long-standing U.S. commitment to the rule of law and secure contracts 
which gave investors in oil and gas development and innovation a guarantee 
that in case of success they will be allowed to obtain justiﬁ ed share of bene-
ﬁ ts.
It may come as a surprise that all breaking through innovations had been 
developed not only without direct governmental support but to some extend in 
contradiction to directions set in publically sponsored programs. On the contrary, 
programs sponsored by Department of Energy, like the one run Synfuels Corpora-
tions or the other, regarding Clinch River breeder reactor failed, burning taxpayers 
money without the eﬀ ect. Eventually these eﬀ orts led to a conclusion that they 
“served to frustrate policymakers and research performers alike, and divorce some 
U.S. energy policies and technology investments from the realities of twenty-ﬁ rst-
-century global energy marketplace”9. It has always been a private sector to deliver 
breakthrough innovations shaping the industry and enhancing energy security. The 
above listed fundaments of the US dominance have been present for all time in 
consideration and played in favour of this country much stronger than resources 
availability. American companies have been responsible of either discovery or full 
scale commercialisation of all important technologies pushing forward the oil and 
8 S. Heck, M. Rogers, P. Carroll, Resource Revolution: How to Capture the Biggest Business 
Opportunity in a Century, Boston 2014.
9 J.H. Kalicki, D.L. Goldwyn, Energy & Security. Towards a new foreign policy strategy, 
Washington 2005, p. 426.
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gas industry while ﬁ nancial markets have kept delivering necessary ﬁ nancial re-
sources and the government secured necessary regulatory framework. Here three 
signiﬁ cant examples shall be mentioned. The ﬁ rst major pipeline was constructed 
in Pennsylvania in 1878 and the network quickly expanded ﬁ nanced via capital 
markets. Later, in 1906, the Hepburn Act was passed by Congress, introducing 
third party access concept to such transportation routes10. The ﬁ rst tanker sailed 
actually the Caspian Sea and was invention of one of Nobel brothers but swiftly 
Americans took the lead getting the scale up11  while US government granted 
a protection needed for such investments security sometimes literally with guns 
and torpedoes. Also cracking which was patented in tsar’s Russia in late XIX cen-
tury and eﬀ ectively got protection in 1913 in the US, and only Chevron soon after 
the II World War constructed the ﬁ rst big scale hydrocracking installation in Red-
mond, California closing a long term process enabling disconnecting structure of 
reﬁ nery products from properties of crude12.
It is also worth noting that American policy regarding energy security based 
on the US leadership in oil and gas industry in view of strength of transatlantic 
interconnections has evidenced to be beneﬁ cial for Europe. It is a well known fact 
that during the II World War Churchill approached Roosevelt several times for 
emergency shipments of oil and reﬁ nery products, in some cases volumes in consi-
deration exceeded 0,5 million metric tonnes13. Such operations were possible only 
due to already established commercial relations allowing logistically and ﬁ nancial-
ly for such operations. But it is relatively narrowly recognised that by protecting 
oil routes from Middle East the US in fact protects in bigger extend European than 
its own  oil supply sources. In the case of former market Persian Gulf accounts 
for 17% total oil import while in the latter one for 21% (BP 2012). Since other 
European key source – Russia – supplies mostly Central Europe, if Western Eu-
rope alone is considered, the Middle East share would be even higher. There are 
various reasons for this policy but deﬁ nitely securing network of business relations 
of oil & gas majors plays an important role amongst them14. Their weight for US 
energy security makes any scenario under which Europe falls into energy shortage 
or crises diﬃ  cult to be accepted by the US governing elite. But if these relations 
become one sided then, in a natural way, American governing bodies will have to 
re-evaluate their approach. 
10 V. Smil, Oil, London 2009, p. 137–138.
11 S. LeVine, The Oil and the Glory: The Pursuit of Empire and Fortune on the Caspian 
Sea, New York 2007.
12 V. Smil op. cit., p. 148–149.
13 D. Yergin, op. cit., p. 355–358.
14 A.J. Bacevich, American Empire. The Realities & Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy, 
Cambridge Ma 2002.
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Diminishing role of IOCs’ transatlantic interconnections as a threat 
to European energy security
Over hundred years of cooperation in oil and gas industry various levels of rela-
tions have been developed:
• Initially the physical ﬂ ow served as fundament of the relations in con-
sideration since at the beginning of XX century the import from US was 
a primary source for Western Europe. But even at present round 60 million 
ton of crude and even bigger volume reﬁ ned products are traded across North 
Atlantic15.
• Later the physical ﬂ ow was supplemented and then substituted by direct 
manufacturing and marketing operations of US oil and gas companies in Eu-
rope and vice versa. Still BP and Royal Dutch Shell count among top reﬁ ners 
in USA (occupying the fourth and seventh place respectively)16. On the other 
side ExxonMobil is the second biggest reﬁ ner in Europe.
•  In the next phase R&D facilities were created in other than headquarters’ 
continent drawing on intellectual base available both in US and Western Europe.
• Almost simultaneously to the above presented development oil & gas 
majors started to create networks of satellite companies in various  activities 
related to technology development. One of the most signiﬁ cant examples of 
such cooperation is creation of Inﬁ neum in 1999 by ExxonMobil and Shell 
which swiftly became one of the leading additive producers in the world 
alongside with Lubrizol, Oronite (owned by Chevron) and Afton. Inﬁ neum 
business centres are located in the UK, USA and additionally, in Singapore.  
But somewhere around 2000 this ascending trend slowed down signiﬁ cantly, with 
signal of contractions. These have been the following:
• Alongside a global shift for reﬁ nery products demand supermajors have 
signiﬁ cantly diminished their exposure to oil reﬁ ning in Europe.
• With the US dominance in oil & gas related services both in upstream 
and downstream even European supermajors are more tempted to expand 
their R&D activities in North America. 
Between 2007 and 2011 US based majors sold four big European reﬁ neries, 
resulting with the total withdrawal of Chevron. If ConocoPhilips realizes the publi-
cally stated goal to divest its share in the Irish reﬁ nery this second supermajor will 
also close all European reﬁ nery operations leaving ExxonMobil to be the only one 
present in European oil processing. This has to be viewed alongside a huge divestu-
re program of Royal Dutch Shell, who sold ﬁ ve reﬁ neries and BP and Total selling 
two each in Europe while expanding their presence in the USA. Consequently all 
supermajors increased signiﬁ cantly North American share in their total capacities 
15 D. Yergin, op. cit., p. 40–47; BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy.
16 W. McKenzie, Outsourcing US Refi ning? The Case for a Strong Domestic Refi ning Indus-
try, Washington 2011, p. 18.
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at the expense of European operations. This trend will continue especially as the 
new wave of Asian reﬁ neries come to the market.
As far as R & D is concerned even European supermajors shifted their focus 
to the U.S. Shell, in 2013, modernized and expanded the Houston Center, which 
became one of the largest industrial technology centres in the world and the largest 
of Shell’s three technology hubs with more than 2,000 of scientists and engineers 
including six of the 11 Shell Chief Scientists who are internationally-recognized 
thought-leaders in a range of disciplines. It is also the global base for a number of 
speciﬁ c technology focus areas across upstream and downstream where proﬁ cien-
cy, deep knowledge and thought leadership are concentrated. This step deﬁ nitely 
has downgraded the remaining two Shell’s R&D centres: in Bangalore (India) and 
Amsterdam (Europe). Giving the rapid expansion in Asia it is possible that in the 
next round of rationalisation and increasing eﬃ  ciency the European one will beco-
me the ﬁ rst target. BP who runs 7 key technology centres (3 in USA and UK each, 
1 in Padeborn, Germany) may be forced to reduce the their number and move at le-
ast one to Asia. The American supremajors also tend to concentrate their technology 
development activities in the USA and Asia, marginalizing gradually their respecti-
ve European centres.
As far as allies are concerned in upstream activities special relations had 
been for a long time established between supermajors and the triad of leading explo-
ration technology companies already named in this article: Schlumberger, Hallibur-
ton and Baker Hughes. Even if, in May, 2014 Aker Solutions of Norway and Baker 
Hughes of USA agreed to form an alliance to develop technology for production 
solutions that will boost output, increase recovery rates and reduce costs for subsea 
ﬁ elds,  it was decided the alliance core team would be co-located and based not in 
Europe but in Houston17. 
Also in the downstream technology two biggest alliances: Chevron-Lummus 
Gobal and ExxonMobil-UOP (Honeywell) key roles are given to American units.  
A problem of innovation gap between USA and EU has been widely recogni-
sed and discussed. The negotiations between USA and EU on TTIP, which started in 
2013, shall be used as a tool to transfer at least some of American solutions to foster 
eﬃ  cient transfer of knowledge based activities related to oil and gas industry to Eu-
rope. The ﬁ rst area in consideration refers to regulation on chemicals themselves. As 
Europe implemented REACH program  which is based on mandatory registration of 
all chemical substances introduced to EU market. In the US such obligation neither 
exists nor is foreseen. Therefore EU, in its negotiation position admits, that neither 
harmonisation nor mutual recognition are feasible and consequently limits the scope 
for further agreement to the four following areas:
• prioritise chemicals for assessment and agree on how best to test them,
• classify and label chemicals,
17 World Oil online, Aker Solutions, Baker Hughes form subsea production alliance, May, 7th, 
2014, www.worldoil.com/Aker-Solutions-Baker-Hughes-form-subsea-production-alliance.html.
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• identify and address new or emerging issues,
• share data and protect conﬁ dential business information more eﬀ ectively.
Such approach, albeit understandable in view of cots and beneﬁ ts of RE-
ACH implementation by EU carries a risk of fostering a gap in chemical research. 
An obligation to disclose composition of certain products eﬀ ectively removes in-
tellectual property protection. European approach: no compliance, no sales already 
proved to be ineﬀ ective because oil and chemical companies moved whole value 
chains to the US (although REACH was not the only reason, it created additional 
motivation to do so). Unfortunately the negotiation position is very vague about 
intellectual property issue and protection of classiﬁ ed business information18. 
Even more general are recommendations regarding vehicles19 – the second 
area of primary interest for oil and gas companies. There is no mention about fu-
els and lubricants in the whole document – key products of the industry. Europe, 
which leads regulatory eﬀ orts in this area and posting real achievements20 (some of 
them even giving the Old Continent a competitive edge) may become eventually 
too speciﬁ c market requiring extraordinary solution and thus discouraging global 
companies from investing there.   
The last chance to bring signiﬁ cant US operations back to Europe came with 
announcement of DOE about possible shale gas deposits in various European co-
untries headed by France and Poland.  But after initial wave of exploration pro-
jects, which created hopes especially in Central Europe almost totally dependent on 
Russian gas deliveries, supermajors one after other announced either cancellations 
or signiﬁ cant delays of their projects. Chevron Corporation (CVX) abandoned its 
plans to search for shale gas in Lithuania, citing the “ﬁ scal, legislative and regulato-
ry climate,”. In Poland, Exxon Mobil Corp. (XOM), abandoned eﬀ orts to cultivate 
shale gas because of regulatory shortcomings and diﬃ  cult geological conditions. 
Shale gas in the Ukraine has failed for local demand being insuﬃ  cient to create 
a gas boom as well as for political instability and corruption that have scared oﬀ  
most foreign investors including Shell, ExxonMobil and Chevron. France banned 
fracking technology outright in 2011 preventing even commencement of commer-
cial scale explorations.
Energy security is usually deﬁ ned as an ability to assure sustainable sources 
of energy at commercial conditions at least not disadvantageous to ones available 
for competition. The gradual restraints of supermajors European activities prima-
ry aﬀ ects commercial terms21. Europe already experiences the highest level of oil 
based products prices worldwide, even with correction for excise taxes.  The same 
refers to inland gas prices. This ads to other factors causing massive migration of 
manufacturing from Europe. But other consequences are less visible but they may 
aﬀ ect even security of ﬂ ow of materials. Till recently Europe and USA have en-
18 European Commission, EU–US Transatlantic Trade And Investment Partnership. Regu-
latory issues. EU position on chemicals, 2014.
19 Ibidem.
20 For example in lubricants industry.
21 E. Cziomer, Międzynarodowe bezpieczeństwo energetyczne w XXI wieku, Kraków 2008.
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joyed the most advanced and comprehensive logistics infrastructure allowing for 
elastic and economic movement of vast crude and processed oil volumes. It was 
supplemented by complex network of business and ﬁ nancial arrangements. All of 
that allowed the famous, already indicated, Roosevelt’s pledges of “oil gifts” for 
Churchill to materialize with swift deliveries. 60 years later Barrack Obama anno-
unced a will to supply Europe with LNG to check Gazprom’s strong position in 
European market and rebuﬀ  in advance possible use of “gas weapon”. The problem 
is that, among other barriers:
• neither USA nor Europe operates harbours capable to service volume of 
LNG needed to make a diﬀ erence,
• supermajors do not have access to supply channels capable to move vo-
lumes needed from the US sources to European customers. 
Before the shale gas revolution the key trade route for LNG was form Qatar 
to the US while Europe had been supplied via pipelines from Russia, North Sea 
and some other directions while in some countries a local sources also had been 
contributing considerable volumes. Almost total disappearance of the US as a buy-
er (2011 purchases were below 3 billion cubic meters – bcm) freed large volumes 
for Asia and Europe. The biggest global single importer of LNG is Japan with 107 
bcm, more than Europe (91 bcm) where three dominant importers are United King-
dom Spain (25 bcm) and France (14 bcm), basically the only European countries 
with full-scale LNG terminals. LNG accounted for 16% of the total international 
gas shipments in Europe (with the FSU countries) in 2011. This created an opportu-
nity to strengthen customers – in European case mostly utilities – bargaining power 
in relations with Gazprom and Statoil, driving down the prices in western part of 
the continent.22 
Supermajors are constantly looking at opportunities coming from bringing 
LNG to Europe as part of their overall strategy. Between 2000 and 2010 they ma-
naged to increase their share in global liquefaction capacity from 17% to 24% and 
regasiﬁ cation capacity from 3 to 12% becoming a real player on this market23. And 
capitalizing on their strong presence in Europe is tempting for them. The almost 
immediate clear option lays in converting already existing US LNG importing ter-
minals into exporting ones. One obstacle is caused by the fact that US government 
is slow in granting relevant permits, facing contraction from energy intensive indu-
stries24. But the other one comes from deﬁ ciencies in European gas infrastructure:
• limited number of LNG importing terminals, located in countries which 
anyway are the least exposed to Russian political pressure;
22 BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy; Paying the piper. Gazprom and European Gas 
Markets, “The Economist”, 4th of January 2014, p. 46–47.
23 ENI, World Oil and Gas Report, 2011, p. 94–95.
24 E. Crooks, Shale Gas Export will Hurt US, Industry Lobby Says, “Financial Times”, 
March 26th 2013.
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• continent’s pipeline structure developed over many years by individual 
countries and focus mainly on landlocked sources of gas. 
As of 2013 only 21 LNG terminals were operated in Europe with the total 
capacity of 190 bcm. The problem is that out of the ten biggest European terminals 
the top two are located in United Kingdom (Milford Haven/South Hook and Isle 
of Grain), ﬁ ve others in Spain and one in France, Netherlands (Rotterdam) and 
Belgium each. If planned/in construction units are taken into account the situation 
does not change much. The Polish Świnoujście terminal is the only one in Blatic 
Sea area and no other projects are run even if the whole Central Europe is analysed 
(however some intentions have been announced in Finland, Estonia, Romania, La-
tvia and Ukraine)25.  
The problem is that only one of the existing LNG terminals is run by super-
majors: Isle of Grain, by ExxonMobil and Total (with participation of Qatar gas). 
At present IOCs invest in supplying Asia, from Middle East and Australia as the 
most promising trade route in the industry in consideration. Shell, the strongest 
advocate of natural gas role in global energy mix, pointed out that Europe lacks 
a clear position on LNG making 20-30 years investments impossible to carry out26. 
Therefore, while such option cannot be ruled out, deﬁ nitely it will take long time 
and signiﬁ cant eﬀ ort to bring American gas to Europe. 
The TTIP negotiations may become a useful tool to address supermajors’ 
objections preventing them from expansion of LNG business in Europe. Analysing 
original EU position on energy and raw materials one can ﬁ nd important declara-
tions27:
• ﬁ rst of all it recognizes the fact that most trade agreements (like GATT) 
focus on import barriers almost neglecting the issue of export ones;
• secondly it recognizes a problem of third party access to infrastructure 
networks and hubs (like pipelines, LNG terminals) as an important area of 
harmonised regulations;
• it addresses also the of local content requirements or preferences which 
in theory cannot be applied against EU companies but this rule do not refer to 
US branches of supermajors which, as demonstrated already in the article are 
key technology suppliers,
• it aims at limiting governments’ role in the price setting of energy goods 
on both the domestic market for industrial users and of energy goods destined 
for export purposes (dual pricing) in a way to limit the possibility for resource 
rich countries to distort the market and subsidize sales to industrial users,
25 Gas Infrastructure Europe, www.gie.eu.com/index.php/maps-data/lng-investment-data-
base [accessed May the 19th, 2014].
26 S. Pfeifer, Shell urges European Gas Vision, “Financial Times”, November 22nd 2012.
27 European Commission, EU–US Transatlantic Trade And Investment Partnership. Raw 
materials and energy. Initial position paper, 2013.
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• it recommends that the Third Party Access (TPA) should be mandatory, 
subject to regulatory control by an independent regulator bestowed with the 
legal powers and capacity to implement the rule in consideration,
• it aims at total ban of local content requirements;  
• it recommends that all licencing processes in extractive industries must 
be transparent, what is to be achieved via incorporation of Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) to TTIP as well as by granting equal access to 
such rights to US and EU companies (a sovereign right of respective countries 
regarding access to their natural resources is to be limited only to a funda-
mental decision whether given resource is to be open of commercialisation).
Successful negotiations and implementation of the above indicated measu-
res ought to increase attractiveness of Europe as a place to develop gas related 
businesses of supermajors. However the question of time remains in place. Asia 
develops so fast, soaking vast part of their material and intellectual resources that 
even in case of TTIP is agreed and implemented certain business steps have already 
be executed, putting all the expected results in vain. Shall Europe’s role in IOCs 
LNG value chains remain to be restricted only to a pure buyer of generic product, 
without their involvement in manufacturing, distribution, product development on 
the continent,  it risks that supermajors will avoid our continent as a hub for signi-
ﬁ cant developments within their gas arms. Giving an increasing role of the gas 
business for the analysed companies Europe heads further marginalization of it’s 
role in their global operations. 
Albeit arguments set forth above about diminishing role of Europe in IOCs 
activities one has to notice that our continent still weights on their sustainability 
and proﬁ tability. Europe still constitutes the most proﬁ table market worldwide for 
downstream operations. For some supermajors it remains to be either a real hub 
(Total) or at least the leading geographical area for some businesses (PB, Shell, 
ExxonMobil). So nothing has been decided yet. But if the trend of converting Eu-
rope into position of junior partner within the framework of IOCs’ transatlantic 
interconnections endures, it will, at certain point become irreversible harming Eu-
ropean energy security.
Conclusions: coming UE-USA free trade agreement as an opportunity 
to reverse the trend and promote transatlantic operations 
of International Oil Companies
As it was indicated in p. 2 Europe still plays important role in IOCs strategy. There-
fore they remain committed, in own interest, to contribute in various ways, to ma-
intenance of European energy security. But a negative adverse trend in this respect 
could not remain unseen and unchecked. Especially the recent Ukrainian crises 
showed plainly how risky such approach may turn out. 
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Therefore European Union and individual governments should:
• a) recognize diminishing role of European activities of IOCs as a sub-
stantial threat to their energy security,
• b) take advantage of commencing negotiations on EU-USA treaty regar-
ding creation of the commercial zone to create conditions for maintaining the 
present level if not increasing IOCs involvement in Europe,
• c) recognize a pivotal role of technology developments and innovation as 
a tool for securing energy sources as the US recent case proved,
• d) borrow on American achievements in the above mentioned area thro-
ugh encouraging development of R&D centres in Europe.
European governments need to view energy security issue in a more pro-
found and complex way recognizing that beyond a physical access to resources their 
policy shall also consider an access to technological and managerial capabilities 
connected with Oil & Gas industry as a vital pillar of their policy. Since progress in 
these areas is mostly concentrated in the US and run either by American companies 
or American branches of corporations coming from other countries, Europe can 
achieve the above stated goal primary by strengthening ties between their own and 
American centres for R&D and headquarters. Such steps has already be undertaken 
by Norwegian government, which on 2004 already signed an agreement with the 
US on long-term cooperation in area of energy research and technology28. 
Successful outcome of TTIP talks represent an excellent opportunity to sup-
port the above indicated developments29 because:
• harmonisation of regulatory framework regarding especially such areas 
like intellectual property, chemicals registration and compliance may at least 
partially level out the US advantage in innovation environment,
• coordination of climate related policy may encourage IOCs to reconsider 
their policy regarding allocation of manufacturing assets,
• creation of LNG infrastructure in Europe parallel to already existing oil 
one should encourage IOCs to invest in gas business and this way to check 
European dependence on Gazprom.
To achieve above mentioned objectives EU should:
• insist on total removal of dual pricing capabilities (eg. export barriers) 
for energy and fuels as well as local content rules;
• insist on implementation of equal third-party access rules to energy infra-
structure components both in the US and EU;
• reconsider its position on chemicals, especially on REACH regulations;
• include intellectual property protection issue to much wider range of are-
as  in negotiations.
28 J.H. Kalicki, D.L. Goldwyn, op. cit., p. 349.
29 M. Kędzierski, Umowa o wolnym handlu między UE a USA. Jakie korzyści dla Polski, 
Warszawa 2013.
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Poland, being rightfully proud of possessing the oldest oil industry in the 
World, gifted with abundant fossil fuels natural resources and exposed to severe 
energy security problems has a vital interest in contributing to the TTIP process in 
this area. ExxonMobil withdrawal from the shale gas exploration project should 
serve as an emergency ring in this process.
Partnerstwo transatlantyckie a międzynarodowe koncerny naftowe – element euro-
pejskiego bezpieczeństwa energetycznego
Artykuł prezentuje rozwój transatlantyckich powiązań globalnych korporacji naftowych 
– jako jednego z ﬁ larów północnoatlantyckiego systemu bezpieczeństwa. Pokazuje perspektywę 
historyczną ich działalności po obu stronach Atlantyku, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem rozwoju 
wzajemnych powiązań w zakresie wydobycia i przetwarzania węglowodorów, a następnie badań 
i postępu technologicznego. Analizie zostały poddane ostatnio występujące zjawiska, wskazujące 
na znaczące przesunięcie układu sił na rzecz ośrodków amerykańskich. Uznając wpływ powszech-
nie znanych trendów, takich jak wzrost znaczenia narodowych korporacji naftowych krajów pro-
ducenckich oraz „rewolucji łupkowej” w Stanach Zjednoczonych, podkreślono istotne znaczenie 
amerykańskich sukcesów w rozwoju technologicznym i innowacjach jako głównych czynników 
sprawczych analizowanego zjawiska. Europa, jako jak niezdolna do dorównania drugiej stronie 
w zakresie potencjału w omawianych dziedzinach, ryzykuje utratę znaczenia w transatlantyckich 
relacjach. W konsekwencji osłabieniu ulegnie zarówno znaczenie starego kontynentu dla głównych 
uczestników globalnego rynku węglowodorów, jak i poziom jego bezpieczeństwo energetycznego. 
Rozpoczęte negocjacje w sprawie Transatlantyckiego partnerstwa w dziedzinie handlu i inwesty-
cji stwarzają Europie szansę na odwrócenie tego zagrożenia – jeśli wyrównane zostaną różnice 
w ochronie własności intelektualnej, ﬁ nansowania innowacji oraz powstaną warunki do budowy 
wspólnej platformy infrastruktury paliwowej.
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